Congressional Insider Trading: An Analysis of the Personal Common Stock Transactions of U.S. Senators by Yingling, Scott T
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2011
Congressional Insider Trading: An Analysis of the
Personal Common Stock Transactions of U.S.
Senators
Scott T. Yingling
Claremont McKenna College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yingling, Scott T., "Congressional Insider Trading: An Analysis of the Personal Common Stock Transactions of U.S. Senators" (2011).
CMC Senior Theses. Paper 193.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/193
  
CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE 
 
CONGRESSIONAL INSIDER TRADING: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE PERSONAL COMMON STOCK 
TRANSACTIONS OF U.S. SENATORS  
 
 
 
SUBMITTED TO  
PROFESSOR ERIC HUGHSON 
BY 
SCOTT YINGLING 
 
FOR SENIOR THESIS 
SPRING 2011 
April 25, 2011 
- 2 - 
 
 
 
  
- 3 - 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to extend my gratitude to everyone who contributed to this thesis. First, I would like to 
thank my family, particularly my mother. Without the sacrifices she has made, I would not be where 
I am today. I would like to thank Professor Meulbroek and my entire Econ 180 section for their 
insight and contributions. Also, I would like to thank my roommates Sam Corcos and Charles 
Johnson for being great resources of information and ideas for my thesis. They both suggested 
several topics, and it was a suggestion from Charles that gave me the motivation to move forward 
with this idea. Finally, I would like to thank my reader, Professor Eric Hughson. He was always 
available to discuss any problems and he always responded promptly to my emails. Without his 
support, this thesis would look radically different. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 4 - 
 
 
Abstract 
 
I have examined the common stock investments made by members of the U.S. Senate between 2006 
and 2009. I find that the average stock portfolio in the Senate exhibits one and two year cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) of -0.15 % and 0.43%, respectively. This suggests that members of the 
Senate are not trading on insider knowledge as indicated by one previous researcher who calculated 
a one year CAR of 25%. However, my findings are in line with another previous researcher who 
found a one year CAR of about -2% and concluded that Congressmen are not trading on inside 
information. I also examine election-year trades made by senators who lose a reelection bid. This 
cashing out effect amounts to a CAR of 0.43% during the first year post loss, but after two years 
these trades exhibit a CAR of -0.03%. The cashing out group performs no better than the group as a 
whole, indicating that this group did not use their informational advantage to profit during the lame 
duck session.  
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I. Introduction 
 
During the financial crisis of 2008-2009, Americans saw the magnitude of the impact that the 
federal government can have on the financial markets. On September 29, 2008, the House rejected 
the $700 billion bailout package, which sent the Dow Jones Industrial Average 778 points, or 7%, 
downward. Four days later, when the House finally passed the bailout package, the Dow recorded a 
485 point gain. All Americans saw the profound effect that the actions of a legislative body can have 
on stock prices.  
As members of the legislature, U.S. Senators play an important role in the decision-making 
process of the federal government. This inside role might afford them access to material, non-public 
information. Despite this insider role in the government, their common stock transactions are not 
subjected to any unusual conflict-of-interest restrictions1. The behavior of US Senators is governed 
by Senate Ethics rules. In the instance where a particular Senator’s personal stock holdings or other 
financial assets benefit as a result of his or her legislative actions, the U.S Senate Ethics Manual 
presumes that the Senator acted in the public interest and that his or her own financial interest was 
only tangentially related2. While one hopes that public servants would act solely in the public 
interest, the notion that people act to maximize personal utility in their public roles as well their 
                                                                    
1
 Ziobrowski, Alan J. “Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the US Senate,” Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.39, No 4, December 2004., p. 661 
 
2
 Ziobrowski et al., 661 
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private roles is fundamental to public choice theory (Buchanan and Tollison (1984))3. The recent 
examples of former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich—now facing up to five years in prison—and 
Charlie Rangel—who was convicted by a House Ethics panel on 11 counts of ethics violations—
give clear evidence that public officials will act to maximize their personal financial interest.   
Although neither Blagojevich nor Rangel were members of the US Senate, one can easily 
imagine the following scenario unfolding in the Senate: imagine that a publicly traded defense 
contractor was due to win a no-bid contract from the government. A Senator, or someone close to 
the Senator, was a smart investor, could purchase this company’s stock before the no-bid contract 
was publicly awarded. As soon as the announcement is made to the public, the stock will likely 
surge upward, befalling a huge capital gain to the senator and his or her staff, and depriving the 
investors who sold their shares to them of a profit4.  
Anecdotal evidence exists that scenarios like the one described have occurred. For example, 
it is rumored that Dick Durbin sold stocks in September 2008 after attending a closed door meeting 
with senior Treasury and Federal Reserve officials and learning that the financial crisis was much 
worse than expected5. It is well documented that Hillary Clinton turned $1,000 into $100,000 in ten 
months by short-selling cattle futures even though she had no prior experience with futures, short-
                                                                    
3
 Ziobrowski et al, 661 – This statement was made in Ziobrowski’s paper, however, he gave original credit to: Buchanan, 
J.M., and R. Tollison. “Theory of Public Choice II” Univ of Michigan Press (1984) 
4
 Similar to example given by Barbarella et al. “Insider Trading in Congress”. Journal of Business and Securities Law. Vol 
9, 2009. Page 1 
5
 James Rowley. “Durbin Invests With Buffett After Funds Sale Amid Market Plunge.” Bloomberg. June 13, 2009. (I 
originally saw this anecdote and citation in the Eggers and Hainmueller paper that I have cited throughout this paper.) 
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selling, or commodities. At the time of the trades, Bill Clinton was the Governor of Arkansas. 
Hillary Clinton claims that a close friend of hers, James B. Blair, advised her on the trades. At that 
time, Blair was outside counsel to Tyson Foods, which was also Arkansas’ largest employer6. Even 
if Hillary Clinton were in the U.S. Senate at the time of her trades, her actions would not have 
violated Senate Ethics rules.   
 While some would argue that Senate ethics rules which prohibit Senators from engaging in 
an abuse of the public trust would also cover trading on inside information, it is legal to use 
Congressional insider knowledge to trade stocks7. The scenarios discussed above are legal. The 
double standard that exists between corporate and legislative insider trading is astounding. A few 
members of Congress aimed to close this gaping loophole with the STOCK (Stop Trading on 
Congressional Knowledge) Act. First introduced in March of 20068, the STOCK Act never 
advanced very far. It was reintroduced in 2007 and again in 2009. Both times it was referred to 
Committee. It currently resides with the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct9. Since 
2006, the country placed an increased emphasis first on the Iraq War, then the presidential election, 
and now our economic woes. Thus, it appears the political will to pass this act has subsided.  
                                                                    
6
 Charles Babcock. “Hillary Clinton Futures Trades Detailed.” Washington Post. May 27th, 1994.  
7
 One could argue that the SEC’s rule 10(b)-5, which prohibits corporate insider trading, could also be applied to public 
servants, as they have access to insider information, but no Senator has ever been charged with violating this rule in 
regards to his or her own common stock investments while in office.   
8
 Barbabella et al., 3 
9
 Barbabella et al., 4 
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 The goal of this research is to determine whether or not Senators’ investments earn an 
abnormal return on their common stock investments. Like Ziobrowski (2004), I hypothesize that US 
Senators should not earn statistically significant positive abnormal returns on their common stock 
transactions (the null). Given the limitations of the data, which will be described in detail later, I find 
that the common stock investments of US Senators exhibit one and two year CARs between -0.15% 
and 0.43% depending on which transaction date is used for each portfolio of buys and sells.  This is 
a small CAR, and not nearly large enough to indicate that Senators are trading stock base on non-
public information to increase their personal wealth. I used an event-study method to measure 
abnormal returns for common stock buys and sells during the 2006-2009 timeframe. I used calendar-
time portfolio approach with the Fama-French three-factor model. Due to data limitations, I assume 
an equally weighted portfolio. Using monthly return data and assuming that all transactions occurred 
on the last day of the year, the Senate purchase transaction portfolio earns one and two year CARs of 
-0.1% and -0.23%, respectively10. According to these same specifications, a portfolio that mimics 
the sale transactions exhibits slightly negative one and two year CARs of -0.4% and -0.5%, 
respectively, in the two years following the transaction. Precise transaction dates were not available 
in the data, thus separate buy and sell transaction portfolios were created for each year assuming 
uniform transaction dates on the first, middle, and last day of the year.  
                                                                    
10
 This method is almost identical to the one outlined on pages 662-663 of Ziobrowski et al. 
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 Additionally, I check for a “cashing out” effect. The cashing out effect refers to the idea that 
Senators may be more inclined to trade on insider information during the lame-duck session 
following an election loss. Two election years occur during the timeframe covered in my dataset. 
Using the same metrics listed above, but only testing the investments of the lame-duck Senators, I 
find that the Senate buy transaction portfolio earns one and two year CARs of 0.29% and -0.13%, 
respectively. Additionally, in the two years following the transaction date, the sell portfolio of lame 
duck senators exhibits one and two year CARs of 0.14% and -0.10%.  This result is not different 
from the rest of the Senate, and I conclude that lame-duck Senators do not exhibit a cashing out 
effect. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
Much of the political will for the STOCK Act stems from a 2004 study by Georgia State 
University professor Alan Ziobrowski. Ziobrowski, using data from 1993-1998, finds that a portfolio 
of the Senators’ buys exhibits a one year CAR of 25%11. He also documents that a portfolio of sells 
exhibits a slightly positive CAR during the year following the sell, however, in the twelve months 
prior to the sell the CAR is also 25% and peaks close to the time of the sale.12 He also found that the 
trade-weighted portfolio of purchased stocks outperforms the equal-weighted portfolio, which 
suggests that the Senators made much heavier investments the stocks that performed best13. 
Additionally, Ziobrowski documents that the combined portfolio of buys and sells outperforms the 
market by 12% per year. Ziobrowski tested the returns of Republicans versus the returns of 
Democrats for significance and found that party affiliation did not matter.  
My results likely differ from Ziobrowski for a number of reasons. First, we are using 
different time periods for our data. As suggested by Eggers and Hainmueller (2010)14, it is possible 
that Senators were able to trade on inside information during the 1990s and that the intense scrutiny 
in the wake of the corporate scandals in the early 2000s dissuading them from continuing this 
                                                                    
11
 Ziobrowski et al. 675 
12
 Ziobrowski et al. 663 
13
 Ziobrowski et al. 675 
14
 Andrew Eggers and Jens Hainmueller. “The Mediocre Performance of Congressional Stock Portfolios”. MIT Political 
Science Department Research. Paper No. 2011-15. Page 15. 
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behavior. Also at issue is the transaction date used. Ziobrowski reports using the Financial 
Disclosure Reports (FDRs) issued at the end of each year to collect his data, and claims to have 
precise dates reported for each transaction. While I also used the FDRs, transaction dates were not 
available during the years in my dataset. More importantly, FDRs from 1995-1998, four of the six 
years used by Ziobrowski, are available online through the Center for Responsive Politics.15 Like my 
dataset, these FDRs do not report precise transaction dates16. Additionally, the precise dollar value 
of each transaction is not reported. Instead, members must only report which broad value band the 
investment falls between17. Ziobrowski used the mid-point of each value band to solve the value 
problem. 
 In contrast to Ziobrowski, Eggers and Hainmueller’s 2010 study titled “Political Investing: 
The Common Stock Investments of Members of Congress 2004-2008” found that personal 
portfolio’s of the 422 members of the House and Senate actually underperformed the market index 
by 2-3% per year. Eggers and Hainmueller report a negative and statistically significant one year 
CAR of -2% with a 95% confidence interval of [-4.9; -.5]. The author’s acknowledge their differing 
result from Ziobrowski’s and conclude that they cannot explain why their study yielded such 
different results. Even when they reconstruct Ziobrowski’s study using only members of the U. S. 
                                                                    
15
 ( w w w . o p e n s e c r e t s . o r g ) 
16
 To clarify, a handful of senators will sporadically report some precise transaction dates and some precise dollar 
amounts. However, I calculate that more than 95% of the transactions reported lack both a precise transaction date 
and a precise dollar amount. 
17
 These bands are listed in Part IV of this paper 
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Senate, but keep their 2004-2008 timeframe, they cannot replicate his results. Their best explanation 
is that members of the Senate achieved staggering results in Ziobrowski’s 1993-1998 timeframe due 
to luck rather than skill, although they cannot rule out the change in the composition of the Senate, 
changes in market conditions, changes in the amount of scrutiny applied to members of Congress, or 
simply computational error18.  
I find the claims made by both authors that they obtained precise transaction dates to be 
puzzling. My data was hand-collected from the same source as both prior researchers, and neither 
research paper directly addresses the lack of transaction date reporting. My attempts to contact the 
authors of both studies with questions regarding the issue of transaction date reporting were 
ignored19. Eggers and Hainmueller solved the "value band" problem by using the fact that about 25% 
of the investments reported a precise value. They used these investments to fit a distribution of 
precise values and, for each investment in which only the band is known, they imputed the expected 
value of the precise-value distribution within that band20.   
If Ziobrowski (2004) is correct and Eggers and Hainmueller (2010) are incorrect about 
whether or not Senators are trading on inside information, the question remains: does a positive 
CAR indicate insider trading? Moreover, do excess returns on the market indicate insider trading? 
                                                                    
18
 Eggers and Hainmueller, 15  
19
 To be fair, I’m an undergraduate student performing much less intensive research on the same topic. I do not wish to 
imply that they have been negligent in their research; however, the issue cannot be ignored.  
20
 Eggers and Hainmueller, 8. They impute the unknown values using an approach inspired by Milyo & Groseclose 
(1999) 
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Senators have many ways to profit off of their public position. Eggers and Hainmueller (2010) 
showed excess returns on the market when members of Congress invest in companies in which a 
relationship has been established, and that these investments outperform the rest of their 
investments21. They showed that members invest disproportionately in these relationship 
companies22. A relationship included the following: the company was headquartered in the home 
state or home district of the member, the company’s PAC or executive board had donated to the 
Congressman’s campaign, or the company had lobbied the member’s committee23. Eggers and 
Hainmueller report no differences across the members when the group is sorted by seniority, net 
worth, portfolio size, or pre-congressional careers24. 
It appears that Congressmen invest in companies, and presumably industries, in which they 
have more knowledge than the lay investor. This would be evidenced by the committee bias. 
Senators are appointed to committee positions according to expertise—or perceived expertise—and 
therefore it would make sense that the investments in companies which operate in their committee’s 
industry sector would perform better.  Favoring companies that donate to one’s campaign or are 
headquartered in one’s home state or district is not an indication of insider trading. While these 
investments outperform the market, Eggers and Hainmueller did not report a positive or statistically 
significant CAR. Members likely make these investments to establish political relationships. Any 
                                                                    
21
 Eggers and Hainmueller, 13 
22
 Eggers and Hainmueller, 13 
23
 Eggers and Hainmueller, 13 
24
 Eggers and Hainmueller, 13 
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excess returns on the market are merely a reflection of that company’s risk profile during the time 
period studied. The discrepancy in results between Ziobrowski (2004) and Eggers and Hainmueller 
(2010) creates a need for more research to be done to clarify the issue. 
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III. Theoretical Framework 
 
Modern financial theory has studied the merits of illegal insider trading at some length. The 
research is focused on corporate insider trading. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established, 
among other things, that corporate insiders were not allowed to fraudulently sell securities25. Later 
amended by rule 10b-5, illegal insider trading was recognized to include the fraudulent purchase of 
securities. 26 The central premise of opponents of insider trading is that insider trading decreases 
market liquidity, gives the wrong incentives to managers, and is unfair to the investors on the other 
side of the trade27. Proponents of insider trading tout the increased efficiency of capital markets 
through insider trading. The insider’s trades are seen as a signaling effect by the broader market, and 
other investors will not waste as much time attempting to collect the same information.28  
It is important to the financial industry and the broader public to focus on the merits of 
insider trading. This research assumes that the conclusions reached by Lisa Meulbroek’s Smith 
Breeden Prize winning research “An Empirical Analysis of Insider Trading” (1992) would also 
apply when U.S. Senators take on the role of the insider and trade using non-public information. 
Specifically, her conclusions that insider trading incorporates private information into stock prices to 
                                                                    
25
 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, page 88. Located online: http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf 
26
 Meulbroek, Lisa K. “An Empirical Analysis of Insider Trading”. The Journal of Finance. Vol. 47, No. 5 (Dec., 1992). Page 
1664 
27
 Meulbroek, 1661  
28
 Meulbroek, 1661 
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more accurately reflect the true market value of that company—and that any regulation that impedes 
trading may result in less informative prices—are  assumed to be true if a Senator is the insider.      
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IV. Data and Methodology 
 
My study analyzes the common stock transactions reported by members of the U.S. Senate 
between January 2006 and December 2009. Members of Congress are required to disclose several 
measures of their personal wealth, including common stock transactions at the end of each year. 
These reports are not independently audited and do not have a specified format. For example, an 
asset may be listed by its common name, ticker, or by some abbreviation. I used Yahoo! Finance and 
the WRDS CRSP Stock Return File to look up the company names and CUSIP numbers of the 
common stock transactions. I hand-checked each of the approximately 13,000 assets and 
transactions listed to determine which transactions consisted of common stock. After eliminating all 
non-common stock assets, about 3,700 transactions remained. A total of 751 companies are 
represented in the dataset. 
 Some Senators wrote whether or not the transaction was a purchase or sale of stock, and 
some did not. No uniformity exists, except that they must report a capital gain (or loss) on each 
transaction. If the member reported neither a capital gain nor loss, I tagged it as a buy. The 
remaining transactions all reported a gain or loss of income and were tagged as sell transactions.  
 Each transaction also contains an approximate value. This reported value falls between pre-
determined value bands. As shown on the FDRs and listed in Eggers and Hainmueller (2004), value 
band cut-points are at $1,000,  $15000,  $50000,   $100,000,   $250,000,   $500,000,   $1,000,000,   
- 20 - 
 
$5,000,000,  $10,000,000,  and $25,000,000,  and a top band for investments of $50,000,000 or 
more. These value band cut-points have changed since Ziobrowski’s study. More than 95% of the 
transactions failed to report a transaction date. Of the few that did report a date, many of these 
reported the month or the season, for example “Fall 2007”, in which the transaction occurred.  
 Given that I do not know precise transaction dates or their precise values, I organized the 
transactions into equally weighted portfolios by year according to three possible transaction dates: 
the first, middle, and last day of the year. Separate buy and sell transaction portfolios were created 
for each year. Like Ziobrowski (2004), I create transaction based portfolio’s and regress average 
monthly returns during the estimation period on the Fama-French Three Factor Model. Using an 
estimation window 60 months prior to the transaction date, monthly average portfolio returns were 
calculated as follows: 
∑RiŃ  ⁄   NŃ 
RiŃ is the return from sample transaction i in the month Ń and NŃ is the number of transactions during 
month Ń. Next, I regress the average monthly portfolio returns on the Fama-French Three Factor 
Model during the 60 month estimation window according to: 
RρŃ = άρŃ + βrmŃ + γsmbŃ + δhmlŃ + έŃ 
RρŃ is the monthly return on the portfolio at month Ń. The intercept, άρŃ, is the average monthly 
abnormal return on the portfolio. βrmŃ represents the excess return of the market, γsmbŃ represents 
the difference between a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks, and δhmlŃ represents 
- 21 - 
 
the difference between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and portfolio of low book-to-
market stocks. My null hypothesis is that the portfolios do not exhibit abnormal returns that are 
different from 0. Next, I compute abnormal returns during the event period according to: 
ARŃ = RρŃ - άρŃ - βrmŃ - γsmbŃ – δhmlŃ 
I calculate CARs for N months by summing the abnormal returns. I test for statistical significance 
according to: 
T-test for 1 month = ARŃ / Std Error  
For N months, the T-test is:  ∑ ARŃ / (√(N) * Std Error) 
I repeat these steps using daily stock returns. For daily returns, I assume 252 trading days in 
a calendar year and use an event window from -100 days to +504 days. Using both daily and 
monthly returns, I calculate a running CAR in order to view CARs for any timeframe during the 
event window. A T-test is performed to test for significance of each CAR.  
Three buy and three sell portfolios of daily returns—one each per transaction date—are 
created for each year from 2006-2009. The same is true when calculating CARs according to 
monthly return data. When isolating the cashing out effect, only the two election years 2006 and 
2008 were used. Each of these two years contained three buy and three sell portfolios, and only 
according to monthly return data. Due to the fact that using daily returns or monthly returns did not 
change the result of the group as a whole, I decided to only include monthly returns for the cashing 
out group.  
- 22 - 
 
V. Results and Conclusion 
 
Figure 1 shows the one and two year CAR results of the buy and sell portfolio’s using daily 
returns. CARs that failed the T-test are assigned a value of “0” in the CAR summary tables. One 
year CARs range from -0.38% to 0.42%, while total two year CARs range from -0.02% to 0.23%. 
Although statistically significant and sometimes slightly positive, the tight range of values around a 
CAR of 0% allows me to conclude that Senators’ are not trading on inside information. Using 
monthly returns does not change the CAR summaries. As Figure 2 illustrates, one year CARs range 
from -0.15% to 0.30%, while two year CARs range from -0.01% to 0.25%.  
 Figure 3 gives the CAR summary for the incumbents who lost in 2006 and 2008. This is the 
“cashing out” effect variable. The one and two year CARs do not differ from the group as a whole. 
Three and six month CAR summaries are listed in Figure 4. I have included these shorter timeframes 
in an effort to isolate any short-term CARs that might better capture any cashing out effect.  
 Figure 5 is a condensed example of what each portfolio looks like. This includes 
abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns, daily T-stats, a standard error, and an estimation 
period. Figure 6 is a sample regression output from the sixty that were run on the estimation periods 
of each portfolio. In sum, I ran sixty regressions on estimation period data. Of these sixty, twelve 
contained alpha coefficients that failed the T-test, and all twelve of those were regressions run on 
daily return estimation periods.  The sixty β coefficients ranged from 0.99 – 1.25, but only twelve 
- 23 - 
 
had β values over 1.14, reflecting the fact that the Senate holds roughly the market portfolio. All 
sixty β values passed the T-test.  
Although these results indicate no insider trading, further research could be conducted if 
better data were available. Without transaction dates and precise values, any research on the topic 
should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism. Given the amount of opposition research done 
by their opponents and the Senators themselves, it would seem that self-reporting stock transactions 
that exhibit positive CARs would not be in the member’s self-interest. Better disclosure 
requirements are needed before any further meaningful research can be conducted. Determining 
whether or not U.S. Senators are trading on material, non-public information will go a long way in 
restoring the public’s confidence in America’s financial system and in the federal government as a 
whole. Perhaps more importantly, but less likely, if U.S. Senators were ever conclusively found to 
be trading on inside information, it might reignite the debate about the SEC’s rule 10b (5). If the 
research says they are not trading on inside information, more credibility will be granted to 
Congressional hearings targeted on private individuals and corporations accused of doing precisely 
what Ziobrowski (2004) has concluded about members of the U.S. Senate.  
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Figure I 
CAR Summary using Daily Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 year CAR% for Buys by Year and Transaction Date 1 year CAR % for buys by Year and Transaction Date
2006 2007 2008 2009 Total CAR % 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total CAR %
First -0.32136775 -0.08048536 0.118907514 -0.02162046 -0.30456605 First -0.30489983 0.131944221 -0.14674743 0.147688421 -0.17201461
Middle 0.074775029 0.052329477 0.129514511 -0.71939373 -0.46277471 Middle 0 0 0.220118706 -0.52468252 -0.30456381
Last -0.0992418 0.125432011 0 0.026190214 Last 0.113642751 -0.09068669 0.283501181 -0.15598063 0.15047661
2 year CAR % for Sells by Year and Transaction Date 1 year CAR % for Sells by Year and Transaction Date
2006 2007 2008 2009 Total CAR % 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total CAR %
First -0.14435082 -0.11631613 -0.28146964 0 -0.54213659 First -0.22497941 0.177289632 0.262065178 0 0.214375403
Middle 0 0 0 -0.44116495 -0.44116495 Middle -0.20413282 -0.04257822 -0.05675674 -0.37796685 -0.68143463
Last 0.354535186 -0.11262683 -0.31961959 -0.07771123 Last 0.094734251 -0.2368117 0 -0.13087473 -0.27295219
2 year COMBINED Buy and Sell CAR % by year and transaction date 1 year COMBINED Buy and Sell CAR % by year and transaction date
2006 2007 2008 2009 Total CAR % 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total CAR %
First -0.46571857 -0.19680148 -0.16256213 -0.02162046 0.237570538 First -0.52987923 0.309233853 0.115317752 0.147688421 -0.38639001
Middle 0.074775029 0.052329477 0.129514511 -1.16055868 -0.02160977 Middle -0.20413282 -0.04257822 0.163361963 -0.90264936 0.376870821
Last 0.255293388 0.012805183 -0.31961959 0.103901448 Last 0.208377002 -0.3274984 0.283501181 -0.28685536 0.423428796
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Figure II 
CAR Summary Using Monthly Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 year CAR % for Sells by Year and Transaction Date 1 year CAR % for Sells by Year and Transaction Date
2006 2007 2008 2009 Total CAR % 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total CAR %
First 0 0.080203411 -0.22176386 -0.10595873 -0.24751918 First -0.11822949 0.191719494 0 0 0.073490002
Middle 0 0.12099571 -0.35623966 -0.30948615 -0.5447301 Middle 0 0.059156069 -0.07176006 -0.2833675 -0.29597149
Last -0.10038719 -0.17598001 -0.21089227 -0.48725947 Last 0.093230114 -0.3013065 0 -0.20822195 -0.41629834
2 year CAR % for Buys by Year and Transaction Date 1 year CAR % for buys by Year and Transaction Date
2006 2007 2008 2009 Total CAR % 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total CAR %
First 0 0 -0.19373756 -0.03796856 -0.23170612 First -0.15210885 0.12343167 -0.30952268 0.113941367 -0.22425849
Middle 0 0 -0.1760556 -0.35565295 -0.53170854 Middle 0 0 0 -0.28315789 -0.28315789
Last -0.09558849 -0.13170705 0 -0.22729554 Last 0.115997016 -0.11526895 0.130530463 -0.23931002 -0.1080515
2 year COMBINED CAR % by Year and Transaction Date 1 year COMBINED CAR % by Year and Transaction Date
2006 2007 2008 2009 Total CAR % 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total CAR %
First 0 0.080203411 -0.41550141 -0.14392729 0.015813061 First -0.27033834 0.315151164 -0.30952268 0.113941367 -0.15076849
Middle 0 0.12099571 -0.53229525 -0.6651391 0.013021556 Middle 0 0.059156069 -0.07176006 -0.56652539 0.012813602
Last -0.19597567 -0.30768706 -0.21089227 0 0.259963933 Last 0.20922713 -0.41657546 0.130530463 -0.44753198 0.308246845
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Figure III 
 
CAR Summary for “Cashing Out” Effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 year CAR % for Sells by Year and Transaction Date 1 year CAR % for Sells by Year and Transaction Date
2006 2008 Total CAR% 2006 2008 Total CAR%
First 0 -0.221763858 -0.221763858 First -0.114810701 -0.159947286 -0.274757987
Middle 0 -0.335990113 -0.335990113 Middle 0 -0.071760058 -0.071760058
Last -0.100387188 0 -0.100387188 Last 0.140054567 0 0.140054567
2 year CAR % for Buys by Year and Transaction Date 1 year CAR % for buys by Year and Transaction Date
2006 2008 Total CAR% 2006 2008 Total CAR%
First 0 -0.1179441 -0.1179441 First -0.21138851 -0.127312088 -0.338700598
Middle 0 -0.136351374 -0.136351374 Middle 0 0.075120397 0.075120397
Last -0.130135149 0 -0.130135149 Last 0.17261261 0.120733505 0.293346115
2 year COMBINED CAR % by Year and Transaction Date 1 year COMBINED CAR % by Year and Transaction Date
2006 2008 Total CAR% 2006 2008 Total CAR%
First 0 -0.339707958 0.103819757 First -0.326199211 -0.287259374 -0.063942611
Middle 0 -0.472341487 0.199638738 Middle 0 0.003360339 0.146880456
Last -0.230522337 0 -0.029747961 Last 0.312667178 0.120733505 0.153291548
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Figure IV 
 
Short-Term Cashing Out CAR Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Month CAR % for Sells by Year and Transaction Date 6 Month Day CAR % for Sells by Year and Transaction Date
2006 2008 Total CAR% 2006 2008 Total CAR %
First -0.063041454 -0.054510158 -0.117551612 First -0.090485508 -0.106267817 -0.196753325
Middle -0.013546011 -0.124219786 -0.137765796 Middle -0.010668122 -0.180721471 -0.191389593
Last 0 0.11211461 0.11211461 Last Day 0 0.125201621 0.125201621
3 Month CAR % for Buys by Year and Transaction Date 6 Month CAR % for buys by Year and Transaction Date
2006 2008 Total CAR% 2006 2008 Total CAR %
First -0.062278295 -0.072137413 -0.134415707 First -0.122346289 -0.102821325 -0.225167614
Middle -0.044485023 -0.147476747 -0.19196177 Middle -0.068152346 -0.152305594 -0.22045794
Last 0 0.205182001 0.205182001 Last 0 0.218835602 0.218835602
3 Month COMBINED CAR % by Year and Transaction Date 3 Month COMBINED CAR % by Year and Transaction Date
2006 2008 Total CAR% 2006 2008 Total CAR%
First -0.125319749 -0.126647571 -0.016864095 First -0.212831797 -0.209089142 -0.028414289
Middle -0.058031034 -0.271696532 -0.054195974 Middle -0.078820468 -0.333027065 -0.029068347
Last 0 0.317296611 0.093067391 Last 0 0.344037223 0.093633981
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Figure V  
 
Condensed Layout Using the June 28th 2006 Daily Return Buy 
Portfolio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Est date portret mktrf smb hml Event Day Count Daily AR CAR T-Stat Std Err
1 3-Feb-06 -0.004565 -0.005 0.0019 0.0005 28-Jun-06 1 -0.001321 -0.001321 -1.343244 0.0009834
2 6-Feb-06 0.0034834 0.002 0.0022 0.0056 29-Jun-06 2 -0.00655 -0.007871 -5.659175 0.0009834
3 7-Feb-06 -0.011272 -0.0104 -0.0044 -0.0033 30-Jun-06 3 -0.007966 -0.015837 -9.297599 0.0009834
4 8-Feb-06 0.003639 0.0066 -0.002 -0.0031 3-Jul-06 4 0.0013567 -0.01448 -7.362147 0.0009834
5 9-Feb-06 -0.002536 -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0025 5-Jul-06 5 -0.002069 -0.016549 -7.52587 0.0009834
6 10-Feb-06 -0.000325 0.0008 -0.0035 -0.0006 6-Jul-06 6 -0.001363 -0.017912 -7.436003 0.0009834
7 13-Feb-06 -0.006305 -0.005 -0.0048 0.0007 7-Jul-06 7 -0.001118 -0.01903 -7.314155 0.0009834
8 14-Feb-06 0.0094857 0.0093 0.0025 -0.0017 10-Jul-06 8 -0.005204 -0.024235 -8.712714 0.0009834
9 15-Feb-06 0.0053503 0.0033 0.0033 -0.0037 11-Jul-06 9 -0.003006 -0.02724 -9.233213 0.0009834
10 16-Feb-06 0.0089275 0.0076 0.001 0.0002 12-Jul-06 10 0.0013225 -0.025918 -8.334117 0.0009834
11 17-Feb-06 -0.000143 -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0038 13-Jul-06 11 0.0009669 -0.024951 -7.649809 0.0009834
12 21-Feb-06 -0.001985 -0.0028 -0.0025 0.0037 14-Jul-06 12 -0.001401 -0.026352 -7.735468 0.0009834
13 22-Feb-06 0.0077256 0.0065 0.0005 -0.0019 17-Jul-06 13 0.0036088 -0.022743 -6.414203 0.0009834
14 23-Feb-06 -0.002843 -0.003 0.002 -0.0022 18-Jul-06 14 -0.007062 -0.029805 -8.100186 0.0009834
15 24-Feb-06 0.0031412 0.0022 0.0033 0.0015 19-Jul-06 15 -0.002209 -0.032014 -8.405443 0.0009834
16 27-Feb-06 0.0024409 0.0033 0.0018 -0.0051 20-Jul-06 16 0.0063507 -0.025663 -6.524071 0.0009834
17 28-Feb-06 -0.009503 -0.01 -0.0021 0.0015 21-Jul-06 17 0.0009019 -0.024761 -6.106837 0.0009834
18 1-Mar-06 0.0122349 0.0092 0.0063 -0.0024 24-Jul-06 18 -0.00173 -0.026491 -6.349365 0.0009834
19 2-Mar-06 0.0008159 -0.0006 -0.0008 0.0007 25-Jul-06 19 -0.00055 -0.027041 -6.308223 0.0009834
20 3-Mar-06 -0.002194 -0.0014 -0.0002 0.0014 26-Jul-06 20 -0.002552 -0.029593 -6.728756 0.0009834
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Figure VI 
 
Regression Example Using the June 28th 2006 Daily Return 
Buy Portfolio 
 
 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Buy Portfolio
Regression Statistics Daily Returns
Multiple R 0.99362513 June 28th 2006
R Square 0.987290899
Adjusted R 0.98689374
Standard Err 0.000983412
Observations 100
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 0.007212285 0.002404095 2485.880757 7.7846E-91
Residual 96 9.28416E-05 9.671E-07
Total 99 0.007305127
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000216363 0.000101355 2.13469589 0.03533237 1.51741E-05 0.000417552 1.51741E-05 0.000417552
mktrf 1.027570062 0.017604838 58.36861952 8.55256E-77 0.992624737 1.062515388 0.992624737 1.062515388
smb 0.349826467 0.028712569 12.18373971 3.40104E-21 0.292832469 0.406820464 0.292832469 0.406820464
hml 0.051991795 0.039795293 1.306481001 0.194510423 -0.027001236 0.130984826 -0.027001236 0.130984826
